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1 Scope 
1.1 Identification  
This document provides the results for an analysis of various systems and technologies 
intended for evaluation as part of the Cooperative Conflict Avoidance (CCA) work 
package.  The CCA work package is one aspect of a larger program, entitled ACCESS-5, 
to develop technologies and certification criteria that would permit Remotely Operated 
Aircraft (ROA) to safely operate within the various classes of US national airspace 
alongside conventional air traffic. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this study is as follows: 
 To develop criteria to evaluate systems and technologies against the CCA 
requirements for unmanned flight at and above FL400 as part of Step 1 of the 
Access-5 program. 
 To identify current and future technologies that might be used to provide 
Equivalent Level Of Safety (ELOS) for CCA and evaluate them against these 
criteria. 
 To present various technology solutions that may be used in the design of the 
Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS).  These technologies when used together 
should create an environment that provides sufficient information for the 
ROA-Pilot to conduct flight operations/management to an Equivalent Level of 
Safety for collision avoidance.   
2 Evaluation Methodology 
2.1 Orthogonal Systems Information Domains 
The analytical basis for system and technology evaluation applied in this trade study is 
derived from the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF), as modified 
by IEEE-1220 (Standard for Application & Management of the Systems Engineering 
Process).  The DoDAF recognizes 3 different domains of information related to any 
operational system and its supporting elements.  The DoDAF refers to these as the 
“Operational View”, the “Systems View”, and the “Technical View”.  However, upon 
examination one can identify that the information contained in the Systems View and the 
Technical view are somewhat overlapping, or non-orthogonal.  IEEE-1220 resolves this 
issue and defines 3 distinct views of system information that are mutually orthogonal to 
each other: Operational, Functional, and Design (or Physical) views.  These 3 views are 
truly orthogonal, and when taken together can describe all aspects of a system and its 
operating environment.  Figure 1 illustrates the interrelationships of these 3 orthogonal 
information domains. 
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Figure 1  - Orthogonal System Information Domains & Their Relationships 
Requirements and system metrics for the CCA sensor trade studies were allocated across 
these three domains.  Trade study evaluations focused on analyzing each particular 
system with respect to its performance in each of the three orthogonal domains.  The 
specifics of this process are described in the following sections. 
2.2 Evaluation Metrics & Scoring Criteria 
The operational-functional-physical analytical model begins by identifying appropriate 
and applicable measurable performance parameters for the target system in all three of 
the system information domains.  These parameters are listed under their respective 
domains in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1  - Evaluation Parameters 
Each of the chosen parameters is related to a quantifiable measure of effectiveness or 
performance associated with the system, its ultimate goals, and its functional and 
Conflict Look-ahead Time Sec Field Of Regard (Azimuth) Deg (+/-) Total Weight Lbs.
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy) NIC Field Of Regard (Alt) Deg (+/-) Total Cost (Aquire Only) $
Probability of Detection % Detection Range Nmi RMS Power Consumption Watts
Probability of False Alarm % Refresh Rate Sec. Total Volume In.^3
Operational Maturity TRL Azimuth Accuracy Deg. (+/-)
Availability % Elevation/Altitude Accuracy Deg (+/-)
Target Track Capacity # Range Accuracy Nmi (+/-)
Reliability MTBF
Coop or Non-Coop C/N
Env/Weather Susceptibility Y/N
Physical DomainOperational Domain Functional Domain
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operational capabilities.  Table 1 also defines the units of measure used to evaluate the 
actual metric value for the subject system. 
2.2.1 Quantitative Scoring of Metrics 
Each quantified metric is assigned a four-level qualitative scoring scheme as a means to 
compare relative performance of various trade study system or technology options.  
Numerical values of 0, 1, 2, and 3 are applied to the four qualitative scoring levels, with 
the colors red, yellow, green, and blue are respectively associated.  The scoring value is 
of no importance when comparing individual performance parameters.  Table 2 below 
provides a brief description for the levels.  
LEGEND
3
2
1
0
Potential value, but likely unacceptable
Clearly unacceptable to meet CCA objectives
Description
Extremely well-suited to CCA objectives
Meets/exceeds basic CCA needs
 
Table 2  - Qualitative Scoring Legend 
 
These scores must be referenced to appropriate ranges of each performance metric used 
to assess potential CCA solutions in the operational, functional, and physical domains.  
Table 3 shows the ranges used for each of the parameters of Table 1.  The rationale 
behind each range is discussed in the “CCA Functional Requirements Document”. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec > 30 >= 23.5 >= 12.5 < 12.5
NIC
% > 99 >= 97 >= 90 < 90
% < 0.5 <= 1 <= 3 > 3
TRL >= 8 >= 6 >= 3 < 3
% > 98 >= 95 >= 90 < 90
# > 20 >= 10 >= 5 < 5
MTBF > 12000 >= 8000 >= 5000 < 5000
C/N Non-Coop Coop NA NA
Y/N NA N Y NA
Deg (+/-) > 135 >= 110 >= 60 < 60
Deg (+/-) > 20 >= 15 >= 10 < 10
Nmi > 10 >= 8 >= 4 < 4
Sec. < 1 <= 2 <= 5 > 5
Deg. (+/-) < 1 <= 2 <= 4 > 4
Deg (+/-) < 1 <= 2 <= 4 > 4
Nmi (+/-) < 0.05 <= 0.1 <= 0.2 > 0.2
Lbs. < 25 <= 35 <= 50 > 50
$ < 20000 <= 90000 <= 120000 > 120000
Watts < 60 <= 150 <= 200 > 200
In.^3 < 500 <= 650 <= 800 > 800
2.5 2 1 -1
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (Alt)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
 
Table 3  - Parameter Evaluation Ranges 
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2.2.2 Operational Metrics 
Metrics associated with the operational domain are typically related to time-based 
measures and/or mission phases where the system functionality is employed.  However, 
operational metrics can also be associated with the operational environment within which 
the intended system must perform.  The operational metrics shown in Table 3 were 
selected for this trade study, as they are all either directly or indirectly related to the CCA 
requirements. 
2.2.3 Functional Metrics 
Metrics associated with the functional domain are typically related to functional 
transformations of some measured system input into an output that is directly related to 
the system’s intended function and performance.  This includes not only those parameters 
produced by a system function, but also the accuracy of these parameters and any 
associated limits placed on their usefulness.  The functional metrics shown in Table 3 
were selected for this trade study, and are based on the CCA functional requirements 
2.2.4 Physical Metrics 
Metrics associated with the physical domain are all of those measures related to the 
physical needs of the system in order to be installed aboard the subject UAV.  The 
physical metrics shown in Table 3 include principal physical constraints that all aircraft 
designs share in common with respect to systems and equipment. 
2.2.5 Evaluation of Integrated System Solutions 
Evaluating integrated systems is not as straightforward as presented in this document.  An 
attempt was made to match sensor systems, which compliment one another.  Sensors, 
which score low in a certain section, are matched with a system that scored well in that 
particular parameter. 
 
In the Operational Domain each parameter is evaluated and the following data fusion 
logic is applied:  The worse of the two individual scores is used to combine all 
parameters excluding Probability of Detection and the Probability of False Alarms.  The 
reason for this is based on the assumption that for non-statistic based criteria the system 
can only be as good as its weakest component.  The probability based parameters use the 
better of the two independent scores due to the assumption that, given the two systems 
are working properly, the overall performance of the system should not be worse than the 
individual sensor. 
 
The functional domain also employs the philosophy that the overall system can only be as 
good as its weakest link and therefore uses the worse of the two systems for all raw data 
parameters including detection range and field of regard.  If an intruder is outside a 
sensors protected volume, the corresponding accuracy of the sensor should not be used.  
With the use of the worst detection parameters between combined sensors it is acceptable 
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to assume the accuracy of the smaller protection volume to be the better of the two 
sensors.  
 
The physical domain is the simplest of the three domains to combine.  Simple 
summations of the sensors parameters are used.  It is noted that there are current 
technologies that already combine sensors and provide shared usages of equipment which 
should reduce some of these combined values. 
3 Technology Evaluations 
3.1 Individual Systems/Sensors 
3.1.1 Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
TCAS is designed to provide pilot advisories of proximate traffic by taking advantage of 
ICAO-compliant transponders already installed on aircraft to operate with ATC ground-
based radars.  On board TCAS equipment interrogates all aircraft transponders in the 
vicinity and, based on the replies, tracks relative bearing, range.  Relative bearing is 
determined by use of a directional antenna and the range by the time between 
interrogation and receipt of the reply.  These tracks are then used to calculate an 
estimated time to Closest Point of Approach (CPA) using a tau time concept, which 
divides slant range, by the closing speed (range/range rate) in the xy-plane.  When 
altitude is contained in the transponder reply, (Mode C and Mode S Transponders) TCAS 
will also calculate the time to reach co-altitude.  
 
TCAS Mode S EquippedTCAS Mode S Equipped
TCAS
Mode-S/IFF
XPonder
429
TCAS
Mode-S/IFF
XPonder
429
1030 MHz
Interrogation
1090 MHz
“squitter”
Mode A/C Equipped
Mode-A/C
XPonder
 
Figure 2  - TCAS Principal of Operation 
 
As shown in Figure 2 above, the system consists of a TCAS processor, a directional 
antenna and an ICAO-compliant transponder.  The TCAS sends out interrogations on the 
1030 MHz frequency, which is received by a separate antenna connected to the 
transponders.  The transponders then replies on the 1090 MHz frequency.  The content of 
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the response depends on the type of transponder the target aircraft is equipped with.  
Mode A responds only with a vehicle identification, Mode C responds with an altitude in 
increments of 100 ft, and Mode S responds with both identification and altitude in 
increments of 25 ft.  
3.1.1.1 TCAS I 
Principle of Operation: TCAS I is the first generation of TCAS developed to provide 
pilots with ATC-like situational awareness.  The system interrogates all vehicles with 
Mode A, Mode C or Mode S transponders and displays the received information to the 
pilot via a visual display.  It tracks up to 35 vehicles and determines projected traffic 
alerts based on the time to CPA, as described in the previous section.  When a possible 
near miss or collision is detected, the pilot is alerted with a Traffic Advisory or TA.  The 
system does not provide an advisory maneuver to de-conflict.  The pilot must use the 
situational awareness provided to visual acquire the intruder vehicle and respond 
accordingly.  
 
Operational Availability: TCAS I is fully operational and certified in the US only (TCAS 
I is not recognized outside the US).  It currently is mandated as minimal equipment for 
passenger aircrafts with seats for 10-30.  RTCA has published MOPS, DO-197A which 
provides the requirements definition and test procedures while the FAA TSO C118A 
defines the certification requirements for TCAS I equipment. 
 
Equipment Availability: TCAS I is commercially available off the shelf from multiple 
manufacturers.  The functionality amongst the systems evaluated (Honeywell CAS 66A, 
KTA 970 and Goodrich TCAS I) all had similar capabilities and are summed up in the 
evaluation metrics shown below in Table 4. 
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Operational Domain Units
Sec 90 3
NIC 1
% >99 3
% 8 0
TRL 9 3
% 95 2
# 35 3
MTBF 8700 2
C/N C 2
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 180 3
Deg (+/-) 20 2
Nmi 30 3
Sec. 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 5 0
Deg (+/-) 1 2
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 2
Lbs. 22 3
$ $40,000 2
Watts 80 2
In.^3 630 2
Qualitative 
Scoring
Quantitative 
MeasuresMeasurement Parameters
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Operational Maturity
Reliability
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Coop or Non-Coop
Physical Domain
Target Track Capacity
Total Volume
Total Weight
RMS Power Consumption
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
Functional Domain
Availability
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Azimuth Accuracy
Detection Range
Range Accuracy
Refresh Rate
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
 
Table 4  - TCAS I Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview: Overall TCAS I is shown to either meet or exceed the CCA needs 
for most parameters.  In the Operational Domain the Trustworthy parameter is depicted 
as yellow or likely unacceptable due to the fact that the system relies on the integrity of 
the other vehicle.  There is no way to verify the validity of the data.  The probability false 
alarm rate is estimated to be on the order of 8%.  This high occurrence has been 
documented in the percentage of pilots ignoring the TCAS I TA’s or determining it to be 
a nuisance.  The main cause for high false alarm rates is the poor azimuth accuracy, 
which is shown in the Functional Domain metrics.  
3.1.1.2 TCAS II 
Principle of Operation: TCAS II provides all of the capabilities of TCAS I with the 
addition of a Resolution Advisories or RA.  The RA provides the pilot with a 
recommended vertical escape maneuver to maintain or increase the vertical separation 
with intruding aircraft.  While TCAS II interrogates all modes of transponders, it must be 
equipped with a Mode S transponder.  The requirement for a Mode S transponder allows 
coordination messages to be sent between two maneuvering aircraft equipped with TCAS 
II.  It is designed to operate in traffic densities of up to 0.3 aircraft per square nautical 
mile (nmi), i.e., 24 aircraft within a 5 nmi radius, which is the highest traffic density 
envisioned over the next 20 years. 
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Operational Availability: TCAS II is fully operational and certified in the US and 
internationally.  It currently is mandated as minimal equipment for passenger aircrafts 
with more than 30 seats or above 15,000 kg (Public Law 100-223) in the US.  TCAS II 
Version 7 complies with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for 
ACAS II and was mandated for carriage by 2003.  RTCA has published MOPS, DO-
185A that provides the requirements definition and test procedures while the FAA TSO 
C119B and Advisory Circular 20-131a defines the certification requirements for 
installation of TCAS II equipment.  Advisory Circular 120-55a defines the procedures for 
obtaining operational approval for use of TCAS II. 
 
Equipment Availability: Certified TCAS II is commercially available off the shelf from 
three separate manufacturers (L-3 ACSS, Honeywell, Rockwell Collins).  Each has 
distinguishing characteristics but overall has similar parameters with respect to this 
evaluation and is shown in Table 5 below. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 120 3
NIC 1
% >99 3
% 1.5 1
TRL 9 3
% 95 2
# 35 3
MTBF 8700 2
C/N C 2
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 180 3
Deg (+/-) 22 3
Nmi 40 3
Sec. 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 2 2
Deg (+/-) 0.25 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 2
Lbs. 19.5 3
$ $100,000 1
Watts 80 2
In.^3 515 2
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Functional Domain
Total Volume
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 5  - TCAS II Evaluation Metrics 
Evaluation Overview:  TCAS II improves on the two major aspects of TCAS I.  The first 
upgrade results from improved directional antennas that provide a much more accurate 
azimuth reading. The second upgrade is that TCAS II requires a Mode-S transponder, 
which provides altitude data at 25 ft increments instead of the 100 ft increment of Mode-
C.  These two improvements result in a much lower probability of false alarm and an 
overall higher rating than TCAS I.  Although there were no red sores for TCAS II there 
are a few parameters that stand out as not quite meeting CCA requirements. The two 
metrics in the operational domain in question are the Trustworthy and Probability of 
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False Alarm.  The trustworthiness of the system is put into question primarily due to the 
fact that the system is completely reliant on the proper operation of outside equipment.  It 
is impossible to have complete confidence that the responding transponder is providing 
correct altitude.  The probability of false alarm may be lowered with the assumption that 
all vehicles are equipped with Mode-S transponders.  The 1.5% used in the evaluation is 
the percentage observed with all types of transponders.  Isolating only Mode-S 
transponders more precise 25 ft altitude increments should result in a reduction of false 
alarms.  Whether this would result in adequate false alarm rates for Step 1, where the 
assumption of a Mode-S transponder onboard is much higher, has not been completely 
evaluated.  There is a significant increase in cost between the TCAS I and II systems and 
depending on the platform this may become an issue. 
3.1.2 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) 
Principal of Operation: ADS-B is a new technology that relies on the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and onboard systems to determine the aircraft’s position in space.  ADS-B 
provides a broadcast of ownship position, velocity, heading, altitude, identification, and 
aircraft intent data.  What’s unique about ADS-B is that unlike TCAS it does not rely on 
radar for its position information and unlike TCAS equipped aircraft, ADS-B equipped 
aircraft broadcast their ownship information, without being interrogated, for other ADS-B 
equipped aircraft to receive and utilize for conflict avoidance. ADS-B was designed to 
have a reception range of greater than 100 nmi and has the capability of rebroadcasting 
other vehicles data to extend the range of situational awareness.  This is shown in Figure 
3, where an intruder vehicle outside the range of ADS-B has its data relayed via an 
intermediate vehicle.  Currently there are three data links being used by ADS-B.  These 
data links consist of the same Mode-S Transponder used for TCAS (1090 Mhz), 
Universal Access Transceiver or UAT (978 Mhz) or VDL-VHF.  Due to the high usage 
of VHF, this data link is only being used in Asia and Europe. The FAA has announced a 
link decision which utilizes a combination of 1090 MHz Extended Squitter and UAT.  
Mode-S 1090 Mhz will be used as the initial ADS-B link to support near term 
commercial and transport operation capabilities while UAT will be used to support 
general aviation. Communication across data links will require a ground station 
rebroadcast of information as described in section 3.1.4.  If the long range air-to-air ADS-
B applications cannot be satisfied by 1090 ES alone, UAT would be a leading candidate 
to support these requirements.   
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Figure 3  - ADS-B Principal of Operation 
ADS-B is a cooperative system and therefore any non-ADS-B equipped aircraft will not 
be seen by ADS-B equipped aircraft. 
 
Operational Availability:  ADS-B is currently undergoing preliminary demonstrations.  
There are many projects collecting data, including the Alaska Capstone Project where the 
FAA has approved the use of UAT/ADS-B to support “radar-like services” for equipped 
aircraft in areas of Western Alaska without radar coverage.  Currently, there are over 180 
UAT equipped aircraft, involved in the FAA’s Capstone program.  Given the current 
flight demonstration level an assumed TRL of 4-6 is used.  The current expected full 
deployment date is 2013.  Currently there are issues with data integrity and the data 
provided by ADS-B is only allowed to provide situational awareness and may not be used 
to provide TCAS Resolution Alerts.  The degraded integrity of ADS-B compared to 
TCAS is due to the reliance of all data from an external device.  TCAS only receives 
altitude from the target vehicle.  It then determines relative range and bearing based on 
the response time and the direction it came from, respectfully.  ADS-B relies completely 
on the data being sent to it for all 3 degrees of position.  
 
Equipment Availability:  There are multiple manufacturers of ADS-B transceivers.  The 
original ADS-B developer UPS AT, now Garmin AT, produce multiple types and 
configurations, including boxes that can send and receive on both Mode-S and UAT 
frequencies.  They, along with multiple TCAS manufacturers have begun combining the 
two systems into a single unit, which provides both functionalities.  As stated above, 
ADS-B data is not allowed to be used with the TCAS TA/RA algorithm. It can only be 
used for additional situational awareness. 
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Operational Domain Units
Sec 300 3
NIC NIC 1
% >99 3
% 0.1 3
TRL 4 1
% 95 2
# 35 3
MTBF 10000 2
C/N C 2
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 180 3
Deg (+/-) 90 3
Nmi 100 3
Sec. 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 0.62 3
Deg (+/-) 0.25 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.01 3
Lbs. 7.6 3
$ $17,000 3
Watts 18 3
In.^3 327 3
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 6  - ADS-B Evaluation Metrics 
Evaluation Overview:  The ADS-B evaluation resulted in very promising scores.  The 
obvious negatives, which have been mentioned in previous sections, are the 
trustworthiness and the technology maturity of the system. 
 
3.1.3 Traffic Advisory Systems (TAS) 
3.1.3.1 Passive 
Principal of Operation: Passive TAS works as a standalone traffic processor which listens 
in on transponder responses to ground radar and other vehicles TCAS interrogations.  
Due to this passive nature it is impossible to get accurate range from response times.  
This limits the capability of the system and results in the inability to provide TCAS type 
resolution advisories.  These systems are intended to bring situational awareness to the 
general aviation pilot and therefore are inexpensive and portable.  The portability of the 
system removes the need of FAA certification since it is not intended for air vehicle 
installation.   
 
Operational Availability:  Currently TAS passive systems are available on the market.  
FAA will not issue a TC or STC for the installation of this equipment and can only be 
installed via Field Approval Form 337.   
 
  12 
Equipment Availability:  There are many manufacturers of this type of technology but the 
two representative products evaluated in this study are SureCheck Traffic Scope (VR and 
VRX) and Proxalert – R5.  Neither has FAA certification and cost approximately $1000. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 15 1
NIC 1
% 99 2
% 8 0
TRL 7 2
% 95 2
# 10 2
MTBF 8700 2
C/N C 2
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 180 3
Deg (+/-) 12 1
Nmi 5 1
Sec. 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 5 0
Deg (+/-) 1.5 2
Nmi (+/-) 1 0
Lbs. 13.06 3
$ $1,500 3
Watts 2 3
In.^3 43 3
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 7  - TAS Passive Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The poor range and azimuth angle accuracy are the main limiters 
of this system and result in downgrades of the false alarm probability and trustworthiness.  
This is apparent in the red scores shown in the Table 7.  The limited detection range also 
negatively impacts the performance in respect to CCA requirements.  At closing rates of 
1200 knots, the system only will provide 15 seconds of look-ahead time.  The physical 
domain evaluation results in a perfect score, as would be expected for a system designed 
for the general aviation community.  
3.1.3.2 Active 
Principal of Operation:  The TAS active systems act similarly to the passive system with 
the inclusion of an active interrogating transponder.  This transponder interrogates 
vehicles in a similar way to TCAS and removes the need to be in an actively covered 
radar zone to perform.  Overall the system acts very similar to TCAS I without the 
official TCAS TA’s.  It does provide similar alerts that do not use the certified TCAS 
algorithms.   
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Operational Availability:  Active TAS is currently available off the shelf and is FAA 
certified flight equipment under TSO-C147. 
 
Equipment Availability:  As with the passive systems, there are many manufacturers of 
active systems. The products used in this evaluation include Skywatch HP and 
Bendix/King KTA 870.  The price for this product ranges from 20-30K, which still is 
accessible for the general aviation public. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 105 3
NIC 1
% 99 2
% 8 0
TRL 9 3
% 95 2
# 35 3
MTBF 8700 2
C/N C 2
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 180 3
Deg (+/-) 20 2
Nmi 35 3
Sec. 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 5 0
Deg (+/-) 1.5 2
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 2
Lbs. 9 3
$ $29,259 2
Watts 56 3
In.^3 340 3
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 8  - TAS Active Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  It is determined that in all functional and operational domain 
metrics the TAS acts very similarly to TCAS I and is basically indistinguishable in this 
trade study.  
3.1.4 Traffic Information System – Broadcast (TIS-B) 
Principal of Operation:  TIS-B is a ground-based system which integrates multiple 
ground surveillance radar and transponder returns and uplinks the data via the L-band 
978 Mhz frequency and 1090 MHz ES to the vehicles in the same format used for ADS-
B. Aircraft flying at high altitude already equipped with a Mode-S transponder would use 
the 1090 ES.  General Aviation aircraft are equipped with UAT.  Interoperability between 
the links is provided within coverage of the ground ADS-B infrastructure using the 
multilink gateway service provided via the TIS-B uplink (ground-to-air). TIS-B is also 
used to provide “ADS-B reports” on aircraft that are not transmitting ADS-B 
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information.  This data is used as a “gap filler” for situational awareness.  The ground 
system filters out ADS-B responding vehicles from the uplinked data to avoid double 
reporting at the vehicle level.  RTCA DO-286 defines the minimum aviation system 
performance standards for TIS-B including the service volume, traffic information 
volume and the surveillance quality parameters.   
 
Figure 4  - TIS-B Principle of Operation 
 
Operational Availability:  Currently the ground-based rebroadcast infrastructure is not in 
place and is full deployment is not expected until 2013.  The FAA Capstone project in 
Alaska has 10 ground stations rebroadcasting ADS-B only (no primary radar integration).  
There are also plans in place for 36 East coast installations.  FAA plans to create dual 
ground station installation reducing down time and therefore implies that the airborne 
receiver unit will limit the MTBF of the system.   
 
Equipment Availability:  The same transceiver equipment used for ADS-B is used for 
TIS-B.  For more equipment availability information see the ADS-B section 3.1.2.  As for 
the ground station availability there is a dual installation operating at ERAU in Prescott, 
Az along with the Sensis ground stations installed in Western Alaska.  The overall cost to 
each aircraft is negligible, if already equipped with ADS-B. The ground infrastructure 
development will require a much greater investment. 
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Operational Domain Units
Sec 90 3
NIC 2
% >99 3
% 1 2
TRL 3 1
% 95 2
# 25 3
MTBF 10000 2
C/N N 3
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 180 3
Deg (+/-) 90 3
Nmi 30 3
Sec. 5 1
Deg. (+/-) 0.07 3
Deg (+/-) 3 1
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 2
Lbs. 0 3
$ $17,000 3
Watts 0 3
In.^3 0 3
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 9 - TIS-B Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The TIS-B metrics shown in Table 9 projects an overall excellent 
rating.  The only yellow scores are present in the elevation angle accuracy, the refresh 
rate and the operational maturity.  A fully developed and deployed system seems to 
present a promising solution to CCA.  Since TIS-B is an add on to the ADS-B air-to-air 
infrastructure it cannot be evaluated properly as an individual system.  It is important to 
note that the numbers used in the evaluation are dependent on the source, given that the 
TIS-B broadcasts both ground radars and Air-to-Ground ADS-B data, and may affect 
some of the scoring results. 
 
3.1.5 CCD Vision Sensor 
Principal of Operation:  The vision sensor system being 
evaluated consists of multiple fixed starring CCD 
cameras arranged to meet the +/- 110-degree azimuth and 
+/- 15-degree elevation field of regard requirements 
(Figure 11).   Along with the cameras the system consists 
of on-board image processing for moving target detection 
and tracking at 30 Hz.  The image processor provides a 
detected threat’s elevation and bearing angle, along with 
the image size to be downlinked to the AVCS (Section 0).  
There are some techniques including maneuver based passive ranging being developed to 
110°
30°-30°
-110°
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generate 3-D information from the 2-D sensed data provided by the CCD Camera.   The 
cameras should provide a detection range of 3-5 nmi for a general aviation aircraft which 
will decrease with degrading atmospheric conditions.   The option to provide the ROA 
with video data exists if permitted by the bandwidth of the data link.   
 
Operational Availability:  The CCD cameras evaluated in this study are currently in the 
flight test state and are considered to be at TRL 5-6.  There are prototypes available 
including the Field Programmable Gate Arrays or FPGA used to perform the image 
processing.   
 
Equipment Availability:  The two manufacturers evaluated are DRA and Boeing SVS.  
Both have current prototypes being flight-tested. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 15 1
NIC 2
% 95 1
% 1 2
TRL 5 1
% 90 1
# 35 3
MTBF 8000 2
C/N N 3
Y/N Y 1
Deg (+/-) 110 2
Deg (+/-) 15 2
Nmi 5 1
Sec. 0.033 3
Deg. (+/-) 0.07 3
Deg (+/-) 0.03 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.75 0
Lbs. 20 3
$ $75,000 2
Watts 140 2
In.^3 400 3
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 10 - CCD Vision Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The CCD camera alone does not provide adequate conflict 
avoidance.  The main plus this system has is that it is completely non-cooperative in that 
it does not rely on any information from an outside system.  In Step 1 cooperative 
vehicles can be assumed and the true benefits of this system may not be realized until 
later steps.  The main drawback of the system is the fact that the camera is a 2-D sensor 
and the Range accuracy is very poor.  This is shown as the only red score in the 
evaluation metrics shown in Table 10. 
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3.1.6 Infra-Red Sensor 
Principal of Operation:  The IR sensor has the same concept of operation as the CCD 
camera with an increase in detection range.  The use of IR also reduces the susceptibility 
of the sensor to atmospheric conditions.  After preliminary research it was determined 
that a mid-wave IR sensor provided the optimal balance between detection range and 
atmospheric sensitivity. 
 
Operational Availability:  The mid-wave IR sensors used in this evaluation are at a 
similar stage of development as the CCD camera.  The technology is at about TRL 5-6 
and there are prototypes currently available. 
 
Equipment Availability:  There are many developers of the mid-wave IR sensors 
evaluated in this study.  These include Northrop Grumman, Indigo, Raytheon, DRA and 
Boeing SVS. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 18 1
NIC 2
% 95 1
% 1 2
TRL 5 1
% 90 1
# 35 3
MTBF 5000 1
C/N N 3
Y/N Y 1
Deg (+/-) 110 2
Deg (+/-) 15 2
Nmi 6 1
Sec. 0.033 3
Deg. (+/-) 0.07 3
Deg (+/-) 0.03 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.75 0
Lbs. 50 1
$ $300,000 0
Watts 500 0
In.^3 1000 0
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 11 - IR Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The increased range of the IR sensor did not affect the scoring 
when compared to the CCD camera.  The reduced MTBF actually downgrades the overall 
Operational Domain score.  The increased size, cost, and volume degrade performance in 
the Physical Domain.  
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3.1.7 RADAR 
For avoidance of collision with cooperative and uncooperative air traffic, Radar 
technology could represent a possible solution.  EM waves are generated and transmitted, 
and usually scanned, either mechanically or electronically, in a raster or circular pattern, 
and the energy reflected from the intruder received.  The phase difference of the return 
signal or the time of flight is then used to calculate intruder range.   As design 
wavelengths increase over the EM spectrum, from X-rays through visible light and 
infrared to “radio” wavelengths, several effects occur.  Atmospheric and obscurant 
penetration capability increases with increasing wavelength, power required increases, 
and spatial resolution decreases.  In applications that benefit from longer range detection, 
but where precise target location is not required, conventional Radar is appropriate.  If a 
significant probability of collision is indicated, logic similar to the TCAS systems can 
advise or initiate avoidance maneuvers.   
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Radar Principal of Operation 
As shown in Figure 5 above, the simplified system consists of a transmitter, a scanning 
mechanism, a receiver and signal processing logic.  Any EM wavelength can be used, 
although certain bands are more common due to having lower atmospheric attenuation, 
and for this application, the higher (Ka, ~35 GHz) wavelengths provide better location 
and tracking capability.  Also as an advantage for UAV applications, the shorter 
wavelengths can use smaller antennas.  The system can also be designed to interpret the 
Doppler shift of the reflected signal and determine approach speed, if this would be of 
value.  The range of effectiveness is a function of optical power provided, with about 8 
miles typical within practical airborne weight and power limitations.   
 
Principal of Operation:  The system is self-contained and requires no input from any 
outside source in order to detect and track other aircraft.  Most aircraft are made of EM 
reflective materials, and a portion of the transmitted radar signal is reflected back to the 
source.  Being a two-path concept, the inverse square signal strength law is multiplied to 
become a function of RCS (Radar cross section) of the aircraft and the inverse fourth 
power of the transmission.  Regarding RCS, in general the larger the aircraft the greater 
the detection range possible, with variations due to aspect angle of the intruder presented, 
and where stealth aircraft are concerned, some absorption of the signal rather than 
reflection.   
 
Operational Availability:  Radar systems have been built and flown in production aircraft 
for civilian and military use over the past 50 years.  Typical applications are weather 
detection, terrain warning, altimetry, and detection of other aircraft for targeting.  While 
Frequency 
generator 
and 
reflected 
signal 
receiver 
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many similar systems are currently available COTS, and while systems are presently in 
development that could be used, none are presently configured for this application. 
 
Equipment Availability:  There is currently no Radar system in production that would 
meet all of these requirements.  Systems in development would need to be completed and 
tested before production.   When the functional requirements for ROA detect and avoid 
are finalized and the basis for certification established, it is possible that a Radar system 
could be available to meet the need. The manufacturers of these systems include 
Northrop Grumman, Ampithec, Raytheon and BAE. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 24 2
NIC 2
% 95 1
% 1 2
TRL 6 2
% 90 1
# 35 3
MTBF 1000 0
C/N N 3
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 110 2
Deg (+/-) 15 2
Nmi 8 2
Sec. 2 2
Deg. (+/-) 1 2
Deg (+/-) 1 2
Nmi (+/-) 0.0009 3
Lbs. 60 0
$ $300,000 0
Watts 500 0
In.^3 1200 0
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 12 - RADAR Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  Overall a Radar system configured for this application would meet 
most operational and functional requirements, exceptions including MTBF, weight, 
power consumption and cost.  A note on MTBF:  the single unit MTBF of the Radar must 
be compared to the combined MTBF of the two units in TCAS-like cooperative 
detection, since two such units are required to complete the detection loop.  Its detection 
range is adequate for collision avoidance with autonomous response and possibly pilot in 
the loop as well.  Compared to TCAS, the Radar false alert rate is better, and would be 
advantageous even for cooperative intruders.  .  A Radar system for this application could 
probably be designed specifically for airborne intruder detection and flight-tested within 
the Access 5 time frame. 
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3.1.8 Scanning Laser Rangefinder 
For avoidance of collision with cooperative and uncooperative air traffic, a scanning laser 
rangefinder is a version of the LADAR/LIDAR.  LADAR and LIDAR create an image 
and determine very accurately the range to each pixel, but their full imaging capability is 
not necessary to the ROA.  The scanning LASER only needs to detect a signal return and 
track the intruder to calculate intruder flight path.  If a significant probability of collision 
is indicated, logic similar to the TCAS systems can advise or initiate avoidance 
maneuvers.  Ground based systems have been developed that can track up to 50 aircraft at 
a time.   
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Scanning Laser Rangefinder Principal of Operation 
 
As shown in Figure 6 above, the system consists of a Laser transmitter, an agile scanning 
mechanism, a receiver and signal processing logic.  Any Laser wavelength can be used, 
although IR wavelengths provide some atmospheric obscuration penetration.  Some 
systems have passive IR pixel-colocated detectors for longer-range cuding.  Eye safety is 
easily satisfied since the platform is moving and the system is scanning, rather than 
dwelling on a specific point.  The Laser average power levels at the intruder are well 
below eye damage thresholds.  The range of effectiveness is a function of optical power 
provided, with 2 to 4 miles typical for airborne applications. 
3.1.8.1 LADAR 
Principle of Operation:  The system is self-contained and requires no input from any 
outside source in order to detect and track other aircraft.  Existing systems operate in two 
modes, pulsed or continuous wave.  The pulsed mode sends pulses, receives reflected 
energy from the intruder, and determines range from time-of-flight of the pulse.  The 
continuous wave mode sends a modulated beam and measures range as a function of the 
phase shift of the return.  In both cases the lat/long precision comes from the narrow 
beam that is possible with optical wavelengths, and the range precision is due to the high 
frequency of the pulses or wave peaks.   
 
 
Operational Availability:  Many LADAR systems have been built and tested in aircraft 
for military use over the past 25 years by both military labs and aerospace companies.  
While the concept has been proven in many applications including wire detection for 
Scanner 
Laser 
Detector 
Optics 
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NOE flight, Laser altimetry, battlefield target detection and recognition, and while 
several similar systems are currently COTS, none are configured for this application and 
certified by the FAA for commercial use 
 
Equipment Availability: There is currently no LADAR system in production that would 
meet these requirements.  Existing prototypes will need to be configured for this specific 
application, and tested before production, which will only occur when the commercial 
ROA market matures.  When the functional requirements for ROA detect and avoid are 
finalized and the basis for certification established, a Ladar system could be available to 
meet the need. 
 
Operational Domain Units
Sec 9 0
NIC 2
% 95 1
% 1 2
TRL 6 2
% 90 1
# 35 3
MTBF 1000 0
C/N N 3
Y/N N 2
Deg (+/-) 110 2
Deg (+/-) 15 2
Nmi 3 0
Sec. 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 0.1 3
Deg (+/-) 0.1 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.0003 3
Lbs. 40 1
$ $300,000 0
Watts 600 0
In.^3 1100 0
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters
Quantitative 
Measures
Qualitative 
Scoring
 
Table 13 - Laser Evaluation Metrics 
Evaluation Overview:  Overall a Ladar system configured for this application would meet 
most operational and functional requirements, with the exception of those reflecting 
maturity levels, such as MTBF and cost.  A note on MTBF:  the single unit MTBF of the 
Ladar must be compared to the combined MTBF of the two units required for a TCAS-
like cooperative detection.  Also the precision of the Ladar intruder path prediction can to 
some extent offset its detection range, which is in any case adequate for collision 
avoidance with autonomous response.  Compared to TCAS the Ladar false alert rate is 
superior, and would be advantageous even for cooperative intruders. 
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3.1.9 Rejected Technologies 
3.1.9.1 Acoustic Sensors 
The principal of the sensor is to use acoustic beam-shaping to detect sounds of proximate 
air traffic.  After initial research, it was found that the signal-to-noise ratio at high speeds 
would prove to be problematic.  Another problem found was that the directional nature of 
target aircraft sound waves makes head on detection difficult.  These issues, along with 
the under 2 nmi range limitations, constituted the removal of this system from the trade 
study. 
3.1.9.2 Micro-EARTS  
Micro-EARTS is the ground-based microcomputer replacement for the legacy ATC 
EARTS equipment.  Lockheed Martin - Transportation and Security Systems, developed 
the system and the initial understanding was that Micro-EARTS only feeds target track 
data to ATC.  There currently is no capacity to transmit Micro-EARTS tracks via an 
uplink to an aircraft.  The possible usage of land-lines to provide track data directly to a 
ground based ROA may require a re-evaluation of the system.  
3.2 Integrated System Solutions 
3.2.1 TCAS II & ADS-B 
Concept of Operation: Multiple manufacturers have already realized the benefits of 
combining TCAS II and ADS-B.  This system provides dual, independent capabilities for 
sensing all cooperative traffic.  Both the individual TCAS and ADS-B reports are 
available to the ROA pilot and can be displayed as desired (combined or separate).  There 
are options for the processing of the track reports.  The track fusion process can be 
performed onboard and downlink the fused tracks to the ROA or each individual sensors 
track can be made available to the ROA pilot for display with data fusion performed on 
the ground.    
 
Benefits of Blended Solution:  The integrated system provides an increased CCA system 
integrity resulting from dual dissimilar sensing sources.  This provides a fault tolerance 
not present in the individual systems.  ADS-B extends the detection range provided by 
TCAS II.  The constant position accuracy associated with ADS-B’s use of GPS along 
with the range dependent angle accuracy of TCAS provides a complimentary bearing 
accuracy.  The GPS precision for ADS-B results in more accurate bearing angles at long 
range, while the TCAS II bearing precision increases as the range decreases.  The result 
of this combined system is a larger protection volume with overall better accuracies. 
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Operational Domain Units TCAS ADS-B Comb TCAS ADS-B Comb
Sec 120 300 120 3 3 3
NIC 0 NIC 2 2 2
% >99 >99 >99 3 3 3
% 1.5 0.1 0.1 1 3 3
TRL 9 4 4 3 1 1
% 95 95 95 2 2 2
# 35 35 35 3 3 3
MTBF 8700 10000 8700 2 2 2
C/N C C C 2 2 2
Y/N N N N 2 2 2
Deg (+/-) 180 180 180 3 3 3
Deg (+/-) 22 90 22 3 3 3
Nmi 40 100 40 3 3 3
Sec. 1 1 1 2 2 2
Deg. (+/-) 2 0.62 0.62 2 3 3
Deg (+/-) 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 3 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 0.01 0.01 2 3 3
Lbs. 19.5 7.6 27.1 3 3 2
$ 100000 17000 117000 1 3 1
Watts 80 18 98 2 3 2
In.^3 515 327 842 2 3 0
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters Quantitative Measures Qualitative Scoring
 
Table 14 - TCAS II & ADS-B Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The overall system evaluation resulted in all parameters meeting 
or exceeding the CCA requirements in both the Functional and Operational Domains 
except for operational maturity, which is affected by the TRL of ADS-B.  This evaluation 
may be a bit conservative based on the combined TCAS/ADS-B boxes being developed 
and result in a few poor marks in the physical domain. 
3.2.2 TCAS II & ADS-B & TIS-B 
Concept of Operation:  The addition of TIS-B to the TCAS II / ADS-B combined system 
provides the additional capability of tracking non-cooperative traffic.  
 
Benefits of Blended Solution:  See section 3.2.1.  
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Operational Domain Units TCAS ADS-B TIS-B Comb TCAS ADS-B TIS-B Comb
Sec 120 300 90 90 3 3 3 3
NIC 0 NIC 0 2 2 2 2
% >99 >99 >99 >99 3 3 3 3
% 1.5 0.1 1 0.1 1 3 2 3
TRL 9 4 3 3 3 1 1 1
% 95 95 95 95 2 2 2 2
# 35 35 25 25 3 3 3 3
MTBF 8700 10000 10000 8700 2 2 2 2
C/N C C N N 2 2 3 3
Y/N N N N N 2 2 2 2
Deg (+/-) 180 180 180 180 3 3 3 3
Deg (+/-) 22 90 90 22 3 3 3 3
Nmi 40 100 30 30 3 3 3 3
Sec. 1 1 5 1 2 2 1 2
Deg. (+/-) 2 0.62 0.07 0.07 2 3 3 3
Deg (+/-) 0.25 0.25 3 0.25 3 3 1 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 2 3 2 3
Lbs. 19.5 7.6 0 27.1 3 3 3 2
$ 100000 17000 17000 134000 1 3 3 0
Watts 80 18 0 98 2 3 3 2
In.^ 3 515 327 0 842 2 3 3 0
Measurement Parameters Quantitative Measures Qualitative Scoring
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume  
Table 15 - TCAS II & ADS-B & TIS-B Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The inclusion of TIS-B does not truly affect the evaluation of 
systems in Step 1 due to the cooperative assumption above FL400.  The benefit of TIS-B 
becomes more apparent as a non-cooperative traffic is introduced. 
3.2.3 TCAS II & CCD Vision Sensor 
Concept of Operation:  Similar to the TCAS/ADS-B combination, this system provides 
dual, independent capabilities for sensing all cooperative traffic along with the added 
capability of sensing non-cooperative traffic.   
 
Benefits of Blended Solution:  In addition to the benefits described in the TCAS/ADS-B 
section, the vision sensor provides enhanced bearing and elevation accuracy when within 
its detection range.  The vision sensor also provides the all-important “see” aspect of “see 
and avoid” missing in all other sensors.  TCAS false alarms may be resolved by the 
ability to visually confirm threats. 
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Operational Domain Units TCAS Vision Comb TCAS Vision
Sec 120 15 15 3 1 1
NIC 0 0 2 2 2
% >99 95 >99 3 1 3
% 1.5 1 1 1 2 2
TRL 9 5 5 3 1 1
% 95 90 90 2 1 1
# 35 35 35 3 3 3
MTBF 8700 8000 8000 2 2 2
C/N C N C 2 3 2
Y/N N Y Y 2 1 1
Deg (+/-) 180 110 110 3 2 2
Deg (+/-) 22 15 15 3 2 2
Nmi 40 5 5 3 1 1
Sec. 1 0.033 0.033 2 3 3
Deg. (+/-) 2 0.07 0.07 2 3 3
Deg (+/-) 0.25 0.03 0.03 3 3 3
Nmi (+/-) 0.05 0.75 0.05 2 0 2
Lbs. 19.5 20 39.5 3 3 1
$ 100000 75000 175000 1 2 0
Watts 80 140 220 2 2 0
In.^3 515 400 915 2 3 0
Total Weight
Total Cost (Aquire Only)
RMS Power Consumption
Total Volume
Elevation/Altitude Accuracy
Range Accuracy
Physical Domain
Field Of Regard (El)
Detection Range
Refresh Rate
Azimuth Accuracy
Coop or Non-Coop
Env/Weather Susceptibility
Functional Domain
Field Of Regard (Azimuth)
Operational Maturity
Availability
Target Track Capacity
Reliability
Conflict Look-ahead Time
Trustworthy (G'tee of Accy)
Probability of Detection
Probability of False Alarm
Measurement Parameters Quantitative Measures Qualitative Scoring
 
Table 16 - TCAS II & CCD Vision Evaluation Metrics 
 
Evaluation Overview:  The benefits of adding a vision sensor do not truly become 
apparent until non-cooperative vehicles are entered into the equation.  While combining 
TCAS with a CCD camera lowers the overall score of the system due to the integrated 
evaluation methods described in section 2.2.5, it does improve the one sub par parameter 
of TCAS II – Probability of False Alarm. 
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4 Air Vehicle Control Station 
4.1 Main Elements 
4.1.1 Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) 
The Aircraft Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) will provide an environment where the 
ROA-Pilot has the capability to conduct flight management.  Flight management will 
consist of either direct aircraft control through a control device such as a keyboard or set 
of flight controls (stick, throttle, etc.) or simply monitoring aircraft systems and 
navigation through a set of flight information displays.  The AVCS will contain the 
proper radio equipment in order to communicate with ATC.   
The AVCS may contain the following: 
 Flight Information Displays 
 Radio Communications 
 Flight Control Capabilities 
 Out-The-Window View Capabilities 
The AVCS has to provide the ROA-Pilot with the equivalent types of information that a 
pilot gets from the real cockpit.  This information is fused together by the pilot to create a 
mental model of the world outside the cockpit and therefore enhances the pilot’s SA.  
 
Figure 7 shows the basic connectivity that might exist among the various elements that 
make up the AVCS. 
Flight Data/
Health Display
Flight
Controls
Comms
Box
ATC
CCA
Sensor
Display
CCA
Sensor
Display
AVCS
CCA Processor (subsystem)
Data Process, Device Drivers,
Data Fusion, etc
ROA-Pilot
Fused CCA Sensor
Dislay
CCA Sensor 1...4 Antennas,
Tranceivers, etc.
Mode-S XPDR/ Flight Data/
Health Information
ROA
 
Figure 7 - AVCS Diagram 
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4.1.2 Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA) 
The Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA) has not been completely defined at this point.  
Suffice to say that it will be something akin to what is being used today or a variation 
thereof; the vehicle will contain some type of sensor package that will provide a 
sufficient level of information to the ROA-Pilot. 
4.1.3 CCA AVCS Processor (Subsystem) 
The CCA AVCS Processor (subsystem) is a part of (attached to) the AVCS. It will 
receive input from the CCA sensor packages.  The CCA subsystem will then process the 
sensor package data and provide the requisite information needed by the CCCA sensor 
displays and controls. 
4.1.4 Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
As stated in the DSA ELOS Definition document,  
 
“Airspace Procedures 
The first lines of defense in the 
prevention of mid-air collisions are the 
existing rules, regulations, and 
procedures already in place.  If adhered 
to, these procedures should prevent most 
accident scenarios from ever occurring. 
 
Air Traffic Management 
The second line of defense is the services 
provided by Air Traffic Management 
(ATM).  If an aircraft is under positive 
control, it will receive separation 
information from ATM for other 
cooperative aircraft within the 
surrounding airspace.  The air traffic 
authority assumes responsibility for 
providing separation for all IFR traffic 
and directs the participating aircraft to 
either maintain or change their flight 
path. 
 
 
Procedural
Cooperative
Traffic Avoidance
Air Traffic
Management
See & Avoid
 
Figure 8 - Mid-Air Collision Lines of Defense 
 
Cooperative Traffic Avoidance 
Another capability used to avoid mid-air accidents employs the use of on-board traffic 
advisory systems that provide situational awareness to the pilot  concerning all 
cooperative traffic within a  certain range and relative altitude.  These systems, 
mandatory on all aircraft that carry 10 or more passengers, also provide a traffic 
advisory to the pilot of an impending collision or even a resolution advisory directing 
them to execute an optimal avoidance maneuver. 
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See and Avoid 
See and avoid is the last line of defense used by pilots to avoid collisions with other 
aircraft and obstacles located in the air and on the surface.  The effectiveness of this 
method for collision avoidance depends entirely on the ability of the human pilot inside 
the cockpit to detect and track potential collision threats.  The discussions contained 
within this paper focus on on-board or off-board sensing means and aircraft control 
required for ROA to provide this layer of collision avoidance without an on-board pilot.” 
Specific ATC requirements that need to be met are: 
FAR 91 – General Operating Rules 
 91.111 – Operating near other aircraft 
 91.113 – Right-of-Way Rules: Except water operations 
 91.123 – Compliance with ATC clearances and instruction 
FAA Order 7610.4k – Special Military Operations 
 “Method of pilotage and proposed method to avoid other traffic” 
 
4.1.5 ROA-Pilot (ROAP) 
There is an ongoing debate in the UAV community as to whether or not a “pilot” as we 
understand it in the classic definition is needed to operate an ROA.  This debate has 
impassioned supporters on both sides.  Some suggest that we do not need a “pilot” to fly 
or manage the ROA during its mission.  Others maintain that a “pilot” in the loop is 
needed for unforeseen contingencies.  One might even argue that if ROA start operating 
within the NAS that whoever controls/manages the flight will need to be well versed in 
the operations, procedures, and language of ATC.  Table 17 presents some options that 
may need to be considered are: 
 
Certification 
 
Ratings 
 
Currency Level 
 
Private 
Commercial 
ATP 
Military certification 
Special ROA certification? 
 
Instrument 
Multi-Engine 
Military ratings 
Special ROA rating? 
 
3 Take offs/3 Landings 
Every 90 Days 
Military currency 
Special ROA currency? 
 
Table 17 - ROA-Pilot Certification (Assumptions) 
 
4.1.6 CCA Sensor / Pilot Interaction 
The CCA sensor package will be required to provide the ROA-Pilot with timely and 
accurate information.  This information must adhere to the requirements that will be 
outlined by ELOS.  We will examine the types of information each sensor provides the 
pilot individually.  We will then combine sensor information and examine whether or not 
a particular combination of sensor inputs provides the critical information required by 
ELOS. 
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The sensor types discussed will be: 
 TCAS II 
 ADS-B 
 TIS-B 
 Vision 
 
The sensor combinations to be examined are: 
 TCAS II + ADS-B 
 TCAS II + Vision 
 TCAS II + ADS-B + TIS-B 
4.2 Connectivity 
Connectivity among various modules will be required in order to provide the ROA-Pilot 
with the information necessary to conduct safe flight operations/management.  These 
pieces will consist of the following: 
 Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA) 
 Air Vehicle Control Station (AVCS) 
 Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
 Remotely Operated Aircraft Pilot (ROAP) 
 
Figure 9 shows how the different parts might be connected.  The AVCS, ATC, and ROA-
Pilot interconnect in order to provide ELOS, which is then connected, to the ROA.  Each 
connection provides critical information to ELOS.  If one connection fails to provide the 
required information then ELOS is degraded or compromised. 
 
Figure 9 - Basic Module Connectivity 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
(ROA) 
Equivalent Level of Safety 
(ELOS) 
Air-Vehicle  
Command Station  
(AVCS) 
Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) 
ROA-Pilot 
(ROAP) 
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4.2.1 TCAS II 
Figure 10 shows the connectivity of TCAS II to the AVCS. 
Flight Data/
Health Display
Flight
Controls
Comms
Box
ATC
TCAS
Display/
Controls
AVCS
CCA Processor
ROA-Pilot
TCAS II Mode-S XPDR/ Flight Data
ROA
! Standard
TCAS II
Display &
Controls
! Display/Control
Device Drivers
! Intruder 3D Data
! TA/RA
 
Figure 10 - TCAS II Connectivity 
Table 18, shows what types information TCAS II would provide for cooperative and non-
cooperative traffic. 
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Table 18 - TCAS II Data Provided 
4.2.2 ADS-B 
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Controls
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Box
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Display/
Controls
AVCS
CCA Processor
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ATC 
Pilot Visual ID 
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Pilot Visual ID 
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TCAS II  
 Mode S 
TCAS II  
Mode S 
None TCAS II  
Mode S 
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Figure 11 - ADS-B Connectivity 
 
Table 19 - ADS-B Data Provided 
 
4.2.3 TIS-B 
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Controls
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ATC
TIS-B
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ROA-Pilot
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Figure 12 -TIS-B Connectivity 
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4.2.4 Vision 
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Figure 13 - Vision Connectivity 
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